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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
RICHARD PIERCE, 
De fendant -Appe l lan t . 
Case No. 20943 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues to be determined are as follows: 
1) Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial 
to support the jury's verdict. 
2) Whether the Court properly exercised its discretion 
in declining to give an accomplice instruction. 
3) Whether the State's account of the events attendant 
to the alleged crime, including testimony that marijuana was 
traded in exchange for the stolen property, was relevant to prove 
material facts and therefore properly admitted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was convicted by a jury on November 27, 
1984 of the offense of Theft by Receiving, a Third Degree Felony. 
The Information charged that he, on or about May 23, 1984, 
retained, received or disposed of the property of another worth 
more than $250, knowing or believing the property had been 
stolen. There was no dispute regarding defendant's possession of 
the property on or about May 23, 1985. (R. 190-91) It was 
recovered from his possession on his property. (R. 194-95) As a 
defense it was asserted that the defendant had no knowledge of 
the stolen character of the property, and that in any event, the 
value of the property did not exceed $250.00. 
Mike Adams testified that he had personally been 
involved in stealing the property (an air compressor). (R. 116-
17) He further testified that he traded it to the defendant for 
marijuana worth $100, (R. 121) and that he told defendant that 
the air compressor was stolen. (R. 118-19) Other witnesses, 
including defendant, also testified. 
Though there was contradictory evidence both about the 
defendant's belief and knowledge and the compressor's value, the 
jury found that the defendant did have the requisite state of 
mind, and that the property's value supported a felony 
conviction. (R. 58) The defendant filed an appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial included clear and 
direct testimony of Mike Adams that he delivered the stolen 
property to defendant and told him it was stolen. Defendant 
testified, acknowledging that he had possession of the stolen 
compressor both at or around May 23, 1984, and later at the time 
it was recovered. Evidence showed that though the value of the 
compressor was in excess of $300, it was traded to defendant in 
exchange for marijuana worth only $100. This and other evidence 
clearly is sufficient to support the jury's verdict under the 
standard set by this Court. 
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Mr. Adams was not an accomplicef and his testimony was 
not uncorroborated. Even if he had been an accomplice, the 
giving of an accomplice instruction in this case was not required 
since it was within the judge's discretion, and since Mr. Adam's 
testimony was not self contradictory, uncertain or improbable, 
but, rather, clear, definite and consistent. 
The State's evidence of facts attendant to defendant's 
receipt of the stolen property, including the evidence of 
transfer of marijuana worth $100 in exchange for the stolen 
compressor, was intrinsic to the case and essential to the jury's 
understanding of it. That evidence is probative to show, inter 
alia, that the value given in exchange for the stolen property 
was inordinately small—thereby supporting the inference that 
defendant knew or believed the property had been stolen. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's 
verdict. The Court has stated its standard of review of evidence 
supporting a conviction as follows: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
and will only interfere when the evidence is 
so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We also view in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict those facts which can be 
reasonably inferred from the evidence 
presented to it. 
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State V. McCardellr 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). As noted in State v. Booker. 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Oct. 25, 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." jLtaJtfi 
v- LammP Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
fl£££iLd State v. Linden, Utah, 657 p.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 28 (citation omitted). And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
upheld. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State v. 
Isaacson, 704 p.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (ciiing State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d at 93). 
In this case defendant himself acknowledged that he was 
in possession of the compressor on or about May 23, 1984. 
(R. 190-91) Defendant gave his testimony generally, and supplied 
demeanor evidence in the course of giving it. (R. 190-203) Mr. 
Adams gave full testimony, (R. 115-136) and clearly and 
definitely testified that he told defendant the compressor was 
stolen, including some detail regarding circumstances of the 
theft. (R. 118-19) The value and contraband nature of the 
marijuana also were evidence in support of the charge, as 
discussed in POINT III below. Other witnesses provided testimony 
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that added to the f u l l p icture of the transact ion involved. See 
the testimony, for example, of Mr. Ward (R. 158-168 and esp . 167-
68) and of Mr. Church (R. 168-172) . 
The jury members were instructed that they were "to 
determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each 
witness." (R. 56, Instruction No. 13) This accords with "the 
fundamental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury." State v. 
JQaJZiSr Utah, 689 P.2d 5, 11 (1984). Simply because some of the 
evidence was contradicted, does not mean there must have been a 
reasonable doubt. The jury received competent testimony and 
evidence on each contested issue, which, if believed and 
accepted, would support the verdict. The jury was entitled to 
believe which witnesses it determined to believe, and to evaluate 
the evidence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE 
ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION 
Defendant contends that one of the S t a t e ' s w i tnes se s , 
Mr. Adams, was an accomplice to the crime with which defendant 
was charged, that defendant's convict ion was had upon Mr. Adam's 
uncorroborated testimony, that that testimony was s e l f 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable, and that therefore the 
t r i a l judge was required to give a cautionary accomplice 
i n s t r u c t i o n . 
F irs t of a l l , i t i s submitted that Mr. Adams was not an 
accomplice s ince defendant's ac t ions const i tuted a separate crime 
from that committed by Mr. Adams. In State v. Berg. Utah, 613 
- 5 -
P.2d 1125 (1980) the Court affirmed a conviction challenged on 
the ground that the witness was an accomplice whose testimony had 
to be corroborated. Defendant in that case had been convicted of 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. The witness1 
activities had consisted of receiving marijuana from defendant 
under an agreement of sale (though defendant in fact never 
received payment) and subsequently selling it to a third party. 
"The subsequent sale made by [the witness] was not at issue,n 
said the Court; rather, the witness' "participation amounted to 
the crime of possession" and "thus she was not an accomplice to 
one charged with unlawful distribution." Xd. at 1126. 
Similarly, in this case the prior theft by Mr. Adams is 
not at issue, and Mr. Adams' participation amounted to the crime 
of theft under a code section other than U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-408 
(Supp. 1985) for violation of which defendant here was charged. 
Thus, Mr. Adams was not an accomplice to one charged with 
receiving, retaining or disposing of stolen property under § 76-
6-408. 
Second, Mr. Adam's testimony was not uncorroborated. 
The testimony of other witnesses, including defendant himself 
regarding possession of the compressor and the value of the 
commodity given in exchange for it, (R. 190-91, 121) was 
consistent with and supportive of the testimony of Mr. Adams. 
Third, even if Mr. Adams were an accomplice and his 
testimony were uncorroborated, the instruction in this case would 
be "liln the discretion of the court." U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-
7(2) (1982). 
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Finally, the testimony of Mr. Adams was not "self 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable." Id. It was clear, 
definite and consistent. (ii££, e.g. R. 118-19) Indeed, 
defendant argues that it was defendant who offered evidence that 
was contrary to that of the witness. The existence of 
defendant's competing testimony in no way renders Adams1 own 
testimony "self contradictory, uncertain or improbable." 
In sum, none of the multiple and demanding 
circumstances that must be shown before a cautionary accomplice 
instruction becomes necessary, was present in this case. 
POINT III 
SINCE THE STATE'S ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS 
ATTENDANT TO THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMPETENT 
AND RELEVANT TO PROVE MATERIAL FACTS 
REGARDING THE CHARGE, THAT ACCOUNT WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
This Court established, in construing former Utah Rule 
of Evidence 55 (1977) (which is the same for relevant purposes as 
Rule 404(b)) that "evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs that 
is competent and relevant to prove some material fact, other than 
to show merely the general disposition of the defendantr is 
admissible." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983) 
(emphasis in original). £&& alss United States v. BradshaWr 690 
F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1982), si&lX. jfellifcd, 463 U.S. 1210 
(1983). Further, even if the evidence implicates defendant in 
the commission of other crimes for which he has not been charged, 
that evidence is nevertheless admissible. Dutton v. State. Utah, 
581 P.2d 856, 858 (1978). 
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The information charged that defendant retained, 
received or disposed of property of another worth more than $250, 
knowing the property had been stolen or believing it probably had 
been stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner. The evidence 
that the defendant paid to Michael Adams $100.00 worth of 
marijuana was competent and significantly relevant in proof of 
that issue. It goes for example, to the question of the 
defendants "knowledge" and "intent," both of which elements are 
expressly stated in Rule 404(b) as acceptable bases for 
admissibility. Moreover, the knowledge and intent of defendant 
it goes to show in this instance are the very criminal knowledge 
and intent that are intrinsic to the crime. And it goes to the 
similar question of "belief" that is an alternative basis for 
conviction under U.C.A., § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1985). 
Following is one demonstration of the link. If 
defendant received the air compressor in return for something of 
disproportionately small value, the jury reasonably could infer 
knowledge or belief of defendant that the item was, or probably 
was, stolen, and intent to commit the crime. Here, in fact, 
though the discounted purchase price of the air compressor was 
$307, and the insurance reimbursement, after subtracting $100 for 
the deductible, was in the amount of $275 (R. 108), the value of 
the marijuana given in exchange was only $100. (R. 121) 
Also, the trade of something contraband, such as 
marijuana, for the compressor is probative of the compressor's 
being stolen because contraband is more typically and readily 
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exchanged for stolen property than for legitimate goods. And 
:here are other inferences the jury might draw from the relative 
falue of the exchanged items, • rom the manner of theii 
exchange, that would bear on the existence or non-existence of 
the crime charged. 
Evidence of the exchange of the compressor for the 
marijuana was, at the least, "inextricably intertwined" with 
evidence essential to prove commission of the crime charged, and 
was therefore clearly admissible under general United 
States v. McCrMy, 699 f.2d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983) (in 
prosecution for aiding and abet tiny introduction of drugs in 
federal prison, evidence of other acts of dealing in drugs in 
prison held "inextricably intertwined" with evidence used to 
prove crime charged). JS&& generally 2 , Weinstein h M. Berger, 
K.ein stein's Evidence S 404110] at 77 9 (1985). £1. United States 
v. Blanton, 730 F. 2d 1425, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984) (evidence of 
other wrongdoing at time of arrest of defendant not inadmissible 
under Pule 404(b) because that evidence was "part of the X£S 
gestae of the offense*I. 
The District Court correctly ruled thai "the State is 
entitled to present a full and accurate account of the 
circumstances of the commission o£ the crime with which the 
defendant is charged." (R. 65) The probative value of the 
account presented outweighs any possible prejudice. The account 
was essential to the jury'b under B» and) n<j of the case. It is 
intrinsic to the crime. It is admissible. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. The circumstances surrounding Mr. 
Adam's testimony, and the testimony itself, foreclosed any need 
for a cautionary accomplice instruction. The evidence relating 
to the consideration given in exchange for stolen property was 
competent and relevant to prove material facts and was therefore 
properly admitted. 
The juryfs verdict should be upheld, and the District 
Court's rulings should be affirmed. 
DATED this ' s day of May, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON * 
Assistant Attorney General 
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